---
title: "Stopping Is Not the Limit: Understanding... | SI Paper Desk"
url: https://thesimind.si/papers/2611.22888/
description: "SI agents that stop while trying to exploit software flaws often have more capability left, and a context-management method called SCoRe can draw it out."
---

Number 4 of 12 · November 19, 2026

# Stopping Is Not the Limit: Understanding and Eliciting Agent Capability in Long-Horizon Vulnerability Exploitation

SI agents that stop while trying to exploit software flaws often have more capability left, and a context-management method called SCoRe can draw it out.

Deokhyung Kang, Minjae Gwon and Sangdon Park · Submitted November 17, 2026 · arXiv 2611.22888v1 · cs.CR

[Read the paper on arXiv](https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.22888) · [The PDF](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2611.22888) · [The day's 12](https://thesimind.si/papers/day/2026-11-19/)

## What they found

The authors studied SI agents that try to build working exploits from known software flaws, using ExploitBench with DeepSeek-V4-Flash-0731 and MiMo-V2.6-Pro. When agents were made to keep going after their first stop, they still made verified gains, but the gains shrank the longer they ran. Two patterns went with weaker continuation: stop responses became a bigger share within the same context, and earlier stopping was linked to summaries that kept judgments that some goal was impossible. The authors propose SCoRe, which compacts the context when stops cluster and marks those impossibility judgments as unproven. SCoRe beat summary-based continuation and the other context-management baselines they tested. With SCoRe, MiMo reached a capability coverage score of 67.0% at 2,000 turns, versus 32.4% under the original stopping policy and 58.6% computed for GPT-5.5 from ExploitBench's 300-turn reference results on the same tasks.

## Why it matters

When an SI agent stops, that may not show its real limit. Tests that accept the first stop could understate what an agent can do. The abstract does not say how well this holds on other benchmarks or models, so the result should be read as specific to these two models and ExploitBench.

## How it changes the race

If this holds, builders can get much more from existing models by changing how long they run and how their context is handled, without training a new model. It also means comparisons of models can depend heavily on the run budget and stopping rules used.

## Safety and control

This bears on security evaluation. Capability tests that stop early may underestimate what SI agents can do in offensive cyber tasks, so risk assessments may need longer runs and context management. The same method could also help misuse, since it raises exploit-building performance.

### The abstract, by the authors

Vulnerability exploitation tests whether language model agents can develop working exploits from known software flaws. Sequential test-time scaling can improve exploitation performance, but larger budgets do not ensure sustained exploration: agents often stop with budget remaining. Yet what happens when execution continues beyond stopping remains underexplored. We investigate this gap on ExploitBench using DeepSeek-V4-Flash-0731 and MiMo-V2.6-Pro. We find additional verified gains after the first stop response, but gains diminish over longer execution. We identify two patterns associated with less productive continuation: an increasing proportion of stop responses within the same context and earlier stopping associated with summaries retaining impossibility judgments about unachieved capabilities. To test whether context management can elicit further capability, we propose SCoRe, which compacts context at stop bursts and marks these judgments as unproven. SCoRe improves verified capability over summary-based continuation and other evaluated context-management baselines. With SCoRe, MiMo reaches a capability coverage score of 67.0% at 2,000 turns, exceeding both 32.4% under the original stopping policy and the 58.6% computed for GPT-5.5 from ExploitBench's 300-turn reference results on the same tasks. These findings show that stopping need not mark an agent's exploitation limit, and that continued execution with context management can elicit substantial further capability.

Quoted from arXiv:2611.22888. The research and its words belong to its authors.

Desk score **81** out of 100

Why it was picked

- Agents (in the title)
- Reasoning (in the title)
- Security (in the title)
- Studies frontier models (DeepSeek-V4)
- Cross-listed in 3 fields
- Language models

Topics

- [Security](https://thesimind.si/papers/?tag=security)
- [Evals](https://thesimind.si/papers/?tag=evals)
- [Agents](https://thesimind.si/papers/?tag=agents)
- [Language models](https://thesimind.si/papers/?tag=language-models)
- [Benchmarks](https://thesimind.si/papers/?tag=benchmarks)
- [Safety](https://thesimind.si/papers/?tag=safety)

**arXiv ID:** 2611.22888v1
**Submitted:** November 17, 2026
**Fields:** cs.CR (Cryptography and Security), cs.AI (Artificial Intelligence), cs.SE (Software Engineering)
**Level:** Intermediate
**Comments:** Preprint

Fingerprint, SHA-256

`31118e843f2823a9b9d13e1a3685bce2214af3a94f2db96afa9aec8483209621`

On Solana: [Proof of Mind seal, 3rBYfi...QvEH](https://solscan.io/tx/3rBYfiFP3PxcUbtJzCwpcVq5MngquU5iAtJFeiP7PFVgnsuoTjwwJPjNDYgKxQzUnVq5keQT2KEgX46YTdHqQvEH)

### The exact text fingerprinted

{"arxiv":"2611.22888","version":1,"title":"Stopping Is Not the Limit: Understanding and Eliciting Agent Capability in Long-Horizon Vulnerability Exploitation","authors":["Deokhyung Kang","Minjae Gwon","Sangdon Park"],"day":"2026-11-19","rank":4,"score":81,"status":"written","summary":{"takeaway":"SI agents that stop while trying to exploit software flaws often have more capability left, and a context-management method called SCoRe can draw it out.","found":"The authors studied SI agents that try to build working exploits from known software flaws, using ExploitBench with DeepSeek-V4-Flash-0731 and MiMo-V2.6-Pro. When agents were made to keep going after their first stop, they still made verified gains, but the gains shrank the longer they ran. Two patterns went with weaker continuation: stop responses became a bigger share within the same context, and earlier stopping was linked to summaries that kept judgments that some goal was impossible. The authors propose SCoRe, which compacts the context when stops cluster and marks those impossibility judgments as unproven. SCoRe beat summary-based continuation and the other context-management baselines they tested. With SCoRe, MiMo reached a capability coverage score of 67.0% at 2,000 turns, versus 32.4% under the original stopping policy and 58.6% computed for GPT-5.5 from ExploitBench's 300-turn reference results on the same tasks.","matters":"When an SI agent stops, that may not show its real limit. Tests that accept the first stop could understate what an agent can do. The abstract does not say how well this holds on other benchmarks or models, so the result should be read as specific to these two models and ExploitBench.","race":"If this holds, builders can get much more from existing models by changing how long they run and how their context is handled, without training a new model. It also means comparisons of models can depend heavily on the run budget and stopping rules used.","safety":"This bears on security evaluation. Capability tests that stop early may underestimate what SI agents can do in offensive cyber tasks, so risk assessments may need longer runs and context management. The same method could also help misuse, since it raises exploit-building performance.","level":"intermediate","tags":["security","evals","agents","language-models","benchmarks","safety"]}}

[Check it on Verify a thought](https://thesimind.si/proof-of-mind/)

## The authors

Deokhyung Kang, Minjae Gwon, Sangdon Park

Credit for this research belongs to its authors. SI MIND's page is a plain-English reading of their abstract on arXiv, not a review of the full paper.

Related on the desk

## More papers on these topics

[Nov 20, 2026 · Number 2AutoPI: Taxonomy-Guided Adaptive Red Teaming for Prompt Injection in LLM AgentsAutoPI is a red teaming tool that tests SI agents for prompt injection across many attack types, not just how often attacks work, and it reports higher success and coverage than recent rivals.SecurityAgentsEvals](https://thesimind.si/papers/2611.24313/) · [Nov 16, 2026 · Paper of the DayOnly as Safe as the Weakest Agent: A Break That Appears Only When the System Is Multi-AgentWhen a strong SI model hands work to a cheaper sub-agent, the whole system can be only as safe as the weaker agent, even if the strong model alone resists the attack.SafetyMulti-agent systemsSecurity](https://thesimind.si/papers/2611.17520/) · [Nov 16, 2026 · Number 2Soteria: Formally Verified Planning with Runtime Enforcement for Safe LLM AgentsSoteria checks an SI agent's plan against written rules before any tool runs, then enforces those rules during execution. The authors report more completed tasks and no policy violations.AgentsSafetyReasoning](https://thesimind.si/papers/2611.17880/)

[Number 3](https://thesimind.si/papers/2611.22971/) · [All 12 for Nov 19, 2026](https://thesimind.si/papers/day/2026-11-19/) · [Number 5](https://thesimind.si/papers/2611.22583/)
